The Controversial Accession of Junagadh and the Political Landscape of Princely States in 1947

On August 15, 1947, the Nawab of Junagadh, Nawab Mohammad Mahabat Khanji, made a controversial decision to accede his state to Pakistan, which sparked widespread uproar. This decision was announced two days later in the newspapers, revealing that Junagadh, covering an area of 3,337 square miles, was now part of Pakistan, affecting a population of 67,000.

Nawab Mohammad Mahabat Khanji was known for his deep affection for animals, particularly dogs, and even had a beloved buffalo named Maya, whom he would feed sugar every evening. His eccentricity was highlighted when he organized a grand wedding for his two dogs, complete with music and a public holiday, showcasing his unique approach to royal life.

The Nawab had a profound love for Gujarati music and drama, establishing a concert hall within the Sardar Bagh Palace where he hosted live performances. These events featured original costumes, weapons, and jewelry, and he often participated in the plays, emphasizing his commitment to cultural expression and entertainment for his family.

The British Indian Independence Act of 1947 allowed princely states like Junagadh to choose between joining India or Pakistan or remaining independent. The Nawab's decision to align with Pakistan raised questions about the geographical and demographic realities, particularly given the Hindu majority in his state, which complicated the legitimacy of his choice.

The lapse of paramountcy by the British led to confusion, which was exploited by Nawab Muhammad Mahabat Khan of Junagadh to announce his accession to Pakistan. On September 15, he signed an agreement with Pakistan, exacerbating the situation for India, particularly for leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru, V.P. Menon, and Sardar Patel, who were deeply concerned about the implications of such decisions on the nation.

A cabinet meeting was convened to decide the fate of Junagadh, which was seen as a festering wound in the body of the nation. However, before the meeting could take place, Lord Mountbatten summoned Nehru, Patel, and Menon, a move that significantly altered the course of history.

During discussions, it was revealed that Pakistan had allegedly provided Nawab Mahabat Khan with 8 crore rupees to develop a port in Junagadh and establish a military base for 25,000 soldiers. This raised concerns about Pakistan's blackmailing tactics, with Nehru emphasizing the need for military action to counter such threats.

Sardar Patel supported military action against Junagadh, but Lord Mountbatten disagreed, viewing Junagadh merely as a pawn in Pakistan's larger strategy, which was primarily focused on Kashmir. Mountbatten argued that if India claimed Hindu majority in Junagadh as a reason to deny the Nawab's decision, Pakistan could counter with the Muslim majority in Kashmir.

As the first Home Minister of India and a native of Gujarat, Sardar Patel was tasked with integrating princely states into India. He ultimately accepted Mountbatten's suggestion to avoid military action in Junagadh, fearing that such an action could have repercussions in Kashmir. Instead, he proposed increasing vigilance and blockade at Junagadh's borders to teach the Nawab a lesson.

In the meeting with Mountbatten, it was decided to implement a blockade around Junagadh. Additionally, on Nehru's advice, V.P. Menon was sent to Junagadh to investigate the roots of the rebellion, specifically to determine whether the Nawab or his Diwan, Shah Nawaz Bhutto, was behind it. Shah Nawaz Bhutto was noted to be the grandfather of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan.

Menon expressed regret that Nawab Mahabat Khan had been ill for the past ten days and had not been able to meet anyone, including Menon himself, for the last four days. Menon was tasked with delivering an important message from the Indian Cabinet to the Nawab personally.

The speaker expresses concern over the Nawab's deteriorating health, stating it is absolutely impossible for anyone to meet him under the current circumstances. The speaker believes that a meeting with Nawab Jada of Junagadh would be beneficial, but acknowledges the Nawab's preoccupation with cricket makes such a meeting difficult.

The speaker notes that the public in Junagadh is extremely angry regarding the Nawab's decisions. If this anger escalates and the public takes the law into their own hands, it could lead to the downfall of the Nawab's dynasty, with the responsibility resting solely on the current leadership.

Despite limited success in Junagadh, VP Menon managed to incorporate two small estates, Mangrol and Babaria, into India before heading to Delhi. In response, the Nawab dispatched his forces to these areas, leading to a rejection of India's accession by local sheikhs. The speaker emphasizes the need for India to respond militarily to this act of aggression.

The decision to blockade Junagadh was significant, initiated on September 24 as per Prime Minister Nehru's directive. Pakistan was unprepared for this move, and the situation escalated when Lord Mountbatten suggested taking the matter to the United Nations during a meeting on September 27, which the speaker views as a major mistake, arguing that India should respond forcefully to Pakistan's aggression.

The speaker reflects on the British colonial interests during the partition, noting that even retreating colonial powers maintain their interests. The British aimed to control Afghanistan and Central Asia, which influenced their actions. Sardar Patel disregarded Mountbatten's advice, and Indian forces maintained their blockade around Junagadh, leading to the Nawab's fear and eventual decision to flee.

As the Nawab attempted to escape, he left behind an intriguing story involving Begum Sahiba. The scene unfolds with the Begum being called to board a ship that had arrived from Karachi, amidst chaos as they search for a missing child. The urgency of the situation highlights the Nawab's desperate flight from Junagadh.

The Nawab left his wife and child in the palace and took a dog with him on a ship to Karachi, abandoning his responsibilities. Diwan Shah Nawaz Bhutto sought help from Pakistan, but received no response, and the situation in Junagadh deteriorated. On November 7, 1947, Shah Nawaz Bhutto proposed joining India, but the Nawab's reluctance led to a lack of action. The Diwan eventually requested the Indian government to take over, stating they could no longer govern, while the Nawab fled to Karachi.

In February 1948, India conducted a referendum in Junagadh, resulting in 119,000 votes for joining India and only 911 for Pakistan. The Nawab, Mahabat Khan, was among the princely rulers highlighted by Time magazine in 1947, noting that their states housed 25% of India's population. These rulers typically had multiple titles, wives, children, and luxury cars, and many aspired for independence after the British departure.

In Travancore, which included parts of present-day Kerala and Tamil Nadu, the ruler, Maharaja Balarama Varma, and his Diwan, C.P. Aiyar, aimed for independence. On June 11, 1947, Aiyar declared that Travancore would not join India or Pakistan after British rule ended, asserting their desire for sovereignty. This declaration raised concerns about the potential fragmentation of the country.

The public in Travancore quickly opposed the Maharaja and Diwan's decision for independence. Just 20 days before independence, Aiyar faced an assassination attempt, highlighting the growing dissent against his policies. Ultimately, just three days before independence, the Maharaja sent a telegram to Viceroy Mountbatten, expressing readiness to join India, and signed the Instrument of Accession.

In Bhopal, Nawab Hamidullah faced a critical decision: to remain independent or join Pakistan. His choice reflected the broader uncertainty and challenges faced by princely states during the transition period following British rule.

Nawab Hamidullah Khan of Bhopal had several aspirations following the end of British rule, including the desire for an independent nation or the formation of a free federation with other princely states. His ambitions were influenced by his roles as the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes and his close relationship with Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who had even offered him the position of Secretary General of Pakistan. Additionally, his strong friendship with Viceroy Mountbatten played a crucial role in shaping his views on independence.

Just four days before independence, Mountbatten wrote to Nawab Hamidullah, advising him to sign the accession documents before midnight on August 14, assuring him that he would keep them safe until August 25. He suggested that if Hamidullah decided against joining India, he would return the documents. This letter opened a new path for Bhopal, indicating the possibility of remaining independent, which posed a significant threat to India.

As tensions rose, Nawab Hamidullah sent a letter to Sardar Patel, expressing his previous efforts to maintain independence but now acknowledging defeat. He assured Patel that he would transition from being a staunch opponent to a close ally, indicating a willingness to join the Indian Union. Patel responded, emphasizing that joining the Indian Union was not a defeat but a victory for truth and justice, highlighting the collaborative roles played by both parties in this outcome.

While Bhopal's accession to India resolved one issue, it introduced a new challenge with the Nizam of Hyderabad, Mir Osman Ali Bahadur, who firmly declared his refusal to integrate Hyderabad into India. Supported by Kassem Rizvi, the Nizam asserted that the Asaf Jahi flag had stood for centuries and would not be lowered, presenting a significant challenge to Patel's authority.

Hyderabad was a princely state as large as Great Britain, encompassing regions that are now part of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Chhattisgarh. The Nizam, one of the wealthiest individuals globally, aimed to declare Hyderabad an independent nation, a move he announced on June 12, 1947. Without integrating Hyderabad into India, the concept of a united India would remain merely a dream.

In November 1947, Kassem Rizvi, a close aide of the Nizam, visited Delhi not for negotiations but to issue threats. He conveyed that the Nizam was open to discussions only if they were framed as a compromise between two nations, indicating a firm stance against any forced integration with India.

The speaker emphasizes that Hyderabad has never been independent, always remaining a princely state of India. With the departure of the British, it is crucial for Hyderabad to be handed over to the people, suggesting that this transition is in the best interest of both the people and the Nizam.

The speaker warns that if the demands of the Nizam are not met, Hindus in the state may face difficulties. Khasim Rizvi, a leader of the Majlis Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, is mentioned as having organized armed groups known as Razakars, who were involved in communal violence, looting, and murder, indicating a volatile political climate in Hyderabad.

Khasim Rizvi's influence is highlighted, as he had filled the Nizam's court with his supporters, effectively controlling the political landscape of Hyderabad. Despite this, the Indian government managed to sign a Standstill Agreement with Hyderabad, allowing the status quo to continue for a year, although the Nizam refused to sign the Instrument of Accession, complicating India's efforts to integrate Hyderabad.

Shortly after the Standstill Agreement, Hyderabad lent 20 crore rupees to Pakistan, raising alarms about potential rebellion. Reports of arms shipments from Pakistan further indicated that Hyderabad was operating independently, with the Nizam maintaining control over a predominantly Hindu population that desired to join India.

The speaker notes that despite Muslims holding most government positions in Hyderabad, they constituted less than a quarter of the population. Khasim Rizvi instilled fear among these officials, suggesting that their positions would be threatened if the Nizam's rule ended. Meanwhile, the conflict in Kashmir diverted Indian military attention, allowing Hyderabad to remain a focal point of tension.

The speaker emphasizes their understanding of the necessary actions for the people of Hyderabad, asserting that they do not need to be taught by anyone. Meanwhile, in Delhi, members of Jawaharlal Nehru's cabinet are opposing military action against Hyderabad, fearing it could incite riots in South India. Nehru is hesitant to take action, worried that without the Nizam signing an Instrument of Accession, extreme measures could lead to the Nizam aligning with Pakistan, potentially sparking war.

Governor-General Lord Mountbatten is actively seeking a compromise between India and Hyderabad before his term ends. Hyderabad's Prime Minister, Liaq Ali, visits Delhi, reiterating that joining India is not an option. He refutes claims attributed to Qasim Razvi, stating that they have conducted an investigation into allegations against them. Despite a rally led by Razvi, Liaq Ali insists that the option of joining India is off the table, although they are open to a political accord.

Liaq Ali asserts that any decision regarding Hyderabad's future must involve both the Nizam and the people. He stresses that restoring the elected government is paramount, and they are not ready to fully integrate into India. Following a meeting with Nehru, Liaq Ali meets Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who is unwilling to listen to their concerns. The speaker warns that Hyderabad's issues will be resolved similarly to other princely states, emphasizing that their independence is non-negotiable.

The speaker firmly states that they will never agree to an independent Hyderabad that undermines India's unity, which they have fought hard to achieve. They express readiness to resolve issues through dialogue but clarify that they will not consent to an independent Hyderabad. The speaker urges the delegation to return to the Nizam with a clear message to make a decisive choice about their position.

After eight months of seeking independence, the Hyderabad delegation returns with new demands, forgetting previous commitments. On April 22, 1948, the Nizam writes to Mountbatten, asserting that the relationship between the ruler and the people is an internal matter. Mountbatten aims to resolve the Hyderabad issue before leaving India, and due to his efforts, the Indian government grants Hyderabad a status akin to that of an independent state, a privilege not extended to other princely states.

The concessions granted to Hyderabad allow it to create its own laws and maintain a military force of up to 200,000 troops. The Indian army can only enter Hyderabad in cases of internal emergency. The Nizam's authority remains protected under these proposals, which are unique to Hyderabad and not offered to any other princely state.

On June 13, 1948, Sardar Patel agreed to a significant request from Mountbatten regarding the Hyderabad situation, which led to criticism of both Patel and Nehru. Questions arose about whether Hyderabad was on the verge of becoming an independent nation, with only the Nizam's signature remaining for the agreement.

The Nizam of Hyderabad sought special status for the state, which he initially received. However, he later changed his stance, insisting that only complete independence for Hyderabad would be acceptable, indicating a potential new country emerging between India and Hyderabad.

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru announced that negotiations with Hyderabad had ended, while Hyderabad's Prime Minister, Liaq Ali, threatened to bring the issue before the United Nations. Nehru dismissed these threats, and due to health issues, Sardar Patel was resting in Dehradun.

Patel urged Nehru to take action in response to the Nizam's obstinacy and the deteriorating situation in Hyderabad. The Nizam's decisions left India with very few options, leading to the consideration of military intervention as the only viable solution.

On September 10, 1948, Patel sent a letter to the Nizam, offering a final opportunity for Hyderabad to join India, accompanied by certain conditions. The Nizam rejected these terms outright, leading to a decisive response from India.

In response to the Nizam's refusal, the Indian Army launched Operation Caterpillar (also known as Operation Polo) on September 13, 1948, asserting control over the Hyderabad state. The conflict lasted for five days as Indian forces entered Hyderabad from all directions.

On the evening of September 17, 1948, Nizam Osman Ali announced on Hyderabad Radio that he had taken full control of the government due to the political situation and ordered his troops to cease hostilities. He expressed regret for not making this decision sooner and indicated readiness to sign the Instrument of Accession.

Following the Nizam's announcement, his forces surrendered to the Indian Army, resulting in the complete integration of Hyderabad into India. Despite the loss of many lives during the conflict, Patel and Nehru displayed magnanimity post-annexation, appointing Mir Osman Ali as the Raj Pramukh of Hyderabad.